Showing posts with label James Sterngold. Show all posts
Showing posts with label James Sterngold. Show all posts

Friday, September 6, 2013

THE DEBT RESURGENCE: YOURS TRULY GETS VERTIGO FROM WATCHING THIS MOVIE AGAIN

9/6/13

Today’s (i.e., Friday, 9/6/13’s) Wall Street Journal featured a page 1 article entitled “For Corporations and Investors, Debt Makes a Comeback,” which outlined the dangers of growing debt levels that short term and short memories pundits are lauding as the salvation of our economy from the near death experience that it experienced as a consequence of taking on too much debt.

Long time readers know that yours truly shares the sentiments it expressed and could have written the article, had I had the time to do the extensive research its authors conducted, and thus to comment on it seems to be beating on a dead horse.   However, this debt problem seems to be only a comatose horse that refuses to die, or perhaps, in the fashion of the day, and equine zombie that occupies our fascination until it fulfills our nightmares.  So here goes.

Too much debt sunk our economy.   A return to the attitude toward money and borrowing that led to too much debt, even as we bob to an uncertain position just barely at the surface, will surely sink our economy again.   Yet those who purport to know something about how things work, and who only recently acquired such skills as shaving, seem to think that debt is the bromide that will somehow save us.   This endless prescription of the financial equivalent of the hair of the dog is perplexing and troubling to us older guys who have been around the track a few times and thus have a measure of perspective.

Regarding this particular article, it is not as troubling as it appears at first glance; it concentrates mostly on corporate accumulation of debt.   While corporate debt surely had a big role in sinking our economy in 2008-09, personal debt played a far larger role.  That having been written, the ravenous appetite for corporate debt is itself troubling, especially because it is being put on the books as corporate profit growth decelerates to the low single digits.   Yet investors pile into corporate debt, and especially into high yield, or junk, debt, in a desperate search for yield born of Ben Bernanke’s insidious and never ending War on the Elderly.

This rushing into the riskiest corners of the debt market in a reach for yield would be troubling enough if people were using hard accumulated savings to do so.   But apparently they aren’t.   Instead, they are borrowing to do so; margin debt reached a record $384 billion this Spring, up nearly a third from the last year.  The record this year’s margin borrowing transcended was set in 2008; oh, boy.



The article’s authors, James Sterngold and Matt Wirtz, who surely deserve fulsome kudos on such a well written and researched piece, took the trouble to interview one Mr. Gerald Schatz of Fort Washington, PA.  The 78 year old Mr. Schatz, against the wise counsel of his wife, borrowed $500,000 on margin at 1.6% from his broker and invested the proceeds in stocks and bonds, earning “about 6%.”   He commented

“This just made so much sense to me.  Leverage is just using cheap money. I don’t consider this a big risk.”

And then

“I never did anything like that before.  I wouldn’t have bought a lottery ticket.   But this is different.”

It is not at all heartening to know that the likes of Mr. Schatz would not buy a lottery ticket.  A lottery ticket is indeed a poor investment, but it’s only A BUCK!  Instead, he risks half a million dollars arbitraging interest rates.   Shrewd.  Wait until rates start to rise.  One wonders if Mr. Schatz’s broker, who lent him the half million, somehow forgot to mention the impact of rising rates on the value of the bond portfolio that Mr. Schatz bought with borrowed money. 

Perhaps this is indeed, as Mr. Schatz says, “different.”   But surely, at 78, and having accumulated a sizable portfolio, Mr. Schatz has been around long enough to experience that cold feeling of terror that runs down one’s spine at the words “This time it’s different.”


Last night, my wife and I watched Vertigo, the Alfred Hitchcock classic starring Jimmy Stewart and Kim Novak that some experts consider one of the best movies ever made, for about the 10th time.  We very much enjoyed watching it again.   Watching this even darker debt movie again will not be nearly as enjoyable.

Friday, August 16, 2013

EXOTIC INVESTMENT PRODUCTS FOR THE “AVERAGE GUY”: WHAT’S THE POINT?

8/16/13

Today’s (i.e., Friday, 8/16/13’s, page C1) Wall Street Journal contained an article (“Mom-and-Pop Pitches Draw Flak,” by James Sterngold) discussing the concern of some in and around the investment industry about the increasing number of esoteric investment products being sold to small and medium sized investors.   These products, born largely of search for yield in the wake of what I like to call Ben Bernanke’s War on the Elderly and a desire to avoid the kinds of market downturns we saw in 2008, include long and short funds, private equity funds, funds that buy unregistered bond issues, and a range of investment products limited only by money managers’ imaginations and ability to sell.

Regular readers can probably guess my reaction to this proliferation of esoterica in the financial marketplace:   What’s the point? 


I have long contended that the best strategy for just about everyone to follow is to hold a balanced portfolio of stock index funds and bond index funds, with the proportions of each based on one’s long term risk tolerance rather than one’s perceptions of where the market is going, which are as likely to be wrong as they are to be right.   (See my 5/8/13 post,ANOTHER OF THOSE TRITE BUT TRUE INVESTING MAXIMS for only my latest, until now, expostulation on this point.) The only trades one should do in one’s portfolio are an annual rebalancing, which must be done with nearly religious fervor.  It would also help not to look at one’s investments with any degree of frequency; doing do can lead to panic or euphoria, both dangerous emotions in investing.    By holding index funds and religiously rebalancing, one will capture a portion of the stock market’s upside, avoid a portion of the market’s downside and, in almost all cases, beat the performance of more “sophisticated” products in any meaningful time frame.  (The size of the portion of the market’s upside and downside one will avoid depends, of course, on the proportions of one’s portfolio invested in stocks.)  If one really wants to simplify one’s investment life, one could hold a balanced index fund, which holds both a bond index and a stock index and does the rebalancing automatically, though generally in a slightly different manner than an annual rebalancing.

Why do I make this case for index funds with such fervor and certainty?

First, it is difficult for anyone to beat “the market” over any meaningful investment horizon.  The definition of “the market” varies with the asset class in which one is investing, but virtually every market is represented by an index and there is an index fund for just about every index.   These percentages vary as rolling ten year periods change, but the latest I saw is that only 13% of active large cap stock managers beat the S&P 500 index over the prior ten year period.

Second, while there are managers who outperform their indices, there are few (See the last paragraph.) who do so after the fees that actively managed funds charge.  For example, the aforementioned Journal article talks about a retired physician in Florida who bought the Mainstay Marketfield Fund, which takes long and short positions on stocks depending on who knows what criteria.   This fund charges management fees of 1.50%, or 150 basis points.  The Vanguard S&P 500 Index charges 10 basis points on its Admiral Shares.  The spread between index and active fees is not usually this large, but the spread is always considerable and acts as a kind of ankle weight on the performance of actively managed funds.

Third, while there are managers who outperform their indices even after fees, there are not many of them and the chances of your finding the manager who will do so over the next five, ten, or more years are miniscule.  Remember, past performance is not necessarily a good indicator of future performance, so simply picking the best performers for the last ten years doesn’t work.   Things change.  This is called “manager risk.”  One supposes one could find a broker and/or investment advisor who is skilled at finding really great managed funds, but one would have a hard time finding such an advisor who is clairvoyant.  And brokers who can find such great managers will doubtless charge more fees, further reducing the chances of your outperforming “the market,” as defined by an index fund.

Fifth, these exotic new products will not necessarily perform as advertised.  The same physician cited in the Journal article reports that he is not dismayed by the underperformance year to date of his Mainstay Marketfield Fund of the S&P 500 by about 900 basis points because

“I was happy to sacrifice optimal performance on the upside for the defensive characteristics.”

There may be something to this; the Mainstay Marketfield was down only 13% in 2008 while the S&P was down 37%.  But then again there may not be anything to the doctor’s argument; we simply don’t know how the Fund will do in a similar downturn in the future.  And even if Mainstay does that well on relative basis, not every such exotic fund will. 

We do know how a well run index fund will perform; it will do as its index does, less fees.  And we also know that we can adopt defensive characteristics by not putting all our money into a stock index, by balancing out the risks of stocks by holding a bond index.  We further know that we will force ourselves to buy low and sell high with a portion of our portfolios if we religiously rebalance.   And we can achieve all this while not paying an active manager 14 times more than we pay an index “manager.”


A necessary word…

Some have mistaken my enthusiasm for index funds as a rejection of the work of financial advisors.   This is certainly not my intention.   We who have invested, or do invest, for a living and know what we are doing tend to underestimate the difficulty for the average person of techniques such as rebalancing.  We also tend not to be intimidated by talk of markets and the use of jargon by the investment community.  In short, we think it is as easy for the proverbial “average guy” to invest as it is for us to invest.  While this can be the case with just a little bit of effort and a mastery of some pretty elementary arithmetic, it is usually not the case that the “average guy” finds this stuff as easy as I and my colleagues do.   And sometimes people simply need a trusted hand to hold, figuratively of course.  If you are an “average guy,” at least as far as money and investing go and/or you’d feel better working with an expert, by all means work with a financial advisor.   It would be best, though, to work with a financial advisor who is open to index and index fund like products.   More importantly, be careful; while there are some good advisors out there, there are plenty of charlatans in the money business.   And one can usually detect such a mountebank by his or her promises of to deliver “above market returns,” “more yield with the same or less risk,” or “consistent market beating performance.” 

Trust and honesty are far more important characteristics for a financial advisor than are purported investment skill and knowledge.

Even I work with a financial advisor on a portion of my portfolio and have been doing so for about the last 25 years.  It’s good to have someone with experience both similar to and different from mine with whom to discuss things.   He is smart and honest and does his best to keep the costs down.   I trust him and like him and he more than tolerates my enthusiasm for index and index like products.